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RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0962  
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 0054  
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1081  
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0050

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ZAGREB 000791

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [MOPS](#) [OSCE](#) [GG](#) [RU](#) [HR](#)  
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH OSCE CIO PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR  
GEORGIA MIOMIR ZUZUL

REF: A. TBILISI 2089  
[1](#)B. USOSCE DAILY DIGEST 8/24/07  
[1](#)C. USOSCE DAILY DIGEST 8/27/07

Classified By: Rick Holtzapple, POL/ECON Chief, Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

#### SUMMARY

[1](#)1. (C) Former Croatian FM Miomir Zuzul told the Ambassador on August 25 that his recent visit to Georgia and Moscow had convinced him that it was a Russian missile that was involved in the August 6 incident he had been asked to investigate by the OSCE Chairman in Office. Particularly after visiting Moscow, however, he doubted the value of trying to prove that Russia was at fault. Instead, he would be recommending to Spanish FM Moratinos that the OSCE CIO try to broker a meeting between the Georgian and Russian FMs to focus on how to prevent future incidents. This was the one point of agreement in what Zuzul was told by both the Georgians and the Russians. Such a meeting, Zuzul suggested, might also be able to open a dialogue on the future of the OSCE Mission in Georgia. END SUMMARY.

[1](#)2. (C) Zuzul's report to the Ambassador of his trip findings echoed those reported in Refs A and B. The evidence strongly indicated it was a Russian missile, although it was a bit less certain precisely why the missile had been dropped on Georgia. Tensions were high. The Georgians, Zuzul said, were "still on a bit of an international campaign" over the incident. The Russians, after some initial confusion, have agreed on a categorical line that this was a Georgian effort to portray Russia as an aggressor, and they are unlikely to budge from that position. Zuzul noted, however, that he did not hear any Georgian officials call Russian "an aggressor", and he made sure to tell the Russians that in Moscow.

[1](#)3. (C) Zuzul said that would be the gist of his formal report to the Spanish CIO. But, he added, he was also planning to send to Moratinos a separate, "more informal" report proposing possible next steps. Zuzul said he had considered an idea, which he said was suggested by the UK Ambassador in Tbilisi and others, of inviting experts (Russian, Georgian, and international) to meet together and compare views. After his visit to Moscow, Zuzul said he thought this is a bad idea. The Russians would likely refuse, if they came they would just stick to their line, and it would raise media attention and potentially inflame the issue. "I want to help the Georgians," he said, "but such a meeting would not help them." After talking with Spanish FM Moratinos on August 24, Zuzul said he doubted the Spanish would want to try and call such a meeting. (NOTE: Zuzul did not seem aware of the possible EU effort, reported REF C, to organize a new experts mission to seek further clarification of the incident. END

NOTE.)

¶4. (C) Nevertheless, the OSCE cannot just ignore the incident. Instead, Zuzul hoped the OSCE could build upon the one point of agreement in what the Russians and the Georgians had told him: Something should be done to prevent such incidents from happening in the future. Zuzul said he would propose that Moratinos invite the Georgian and Russian FMs to meet to discuss whether there were steps that could be taken, such as international monitoring, or training on radar systems, that could help prevent any future incidents, and whether there was any way the OSCE could help implement such steps or confidence building measures. Zuzul noted that Lavrov had not been much involved in the incident to date, but argued it would be hard for the Russians to refuse such a meeting. An FMs' meeting would by a way to open a dialogue in a more controlled manner, and keeping it out of the media spotlight. A second possible topic for such a meeting would be to discuss the future of the OSCE Mission in Georgia. If things went well on these first two subjects, the meeting might even be able to begin discussion on a "lasting solution" to the South Ossetia question, but Zuzul admitted that it was almost certainly premature to raise that issue now.

¶5. (C) Zuzul said he did not at present have concrete plans to travel to Vienna, or to Spain. He would be speaking again with Moratinos by phone in advance of the Spanish FM's trip to Moscow, but Zuzul planned, for now, to be returning to Washington, DC, with his family on either August 31 or September 5. Before that, he would be meeting Georgian President Saakashvili at a conference in Lake Bled, Slovenia, on August 26 and would discuss these ideas. He stressed, however, that any OSCE initiative could only succeed with US

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and UK support. Other EU members would be more tentative.

¶6. (C) Zuzul concluded by saying that Moratinos was considering him for the vacant Head of Mission position at the OSCE Mission in Georgia. Zuzul said he might be interested, but that the situation needed a higher level of political engagement, and that what he would really like to see would be some sort of UN Special Envoy to help bring together the various strands of Georgian-Russian relations. He would definitely be interested in such a position, if it were created.

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